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Abstract
In this paper we examine how political contexts mediate citizens' ability to un-
derstand political parties' ideological positions, focusing on education level. Using
cross-national data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), we
build on the approach developed by Palfrey and Poole (1987) to study individuals'
ability to place parties in on a `left-right' spectrum. We explore how the eﬀect of
individual education level is mediated by contextual factors in inﬂuencing the supply
and clarity of `left-right' information in a party system. The results show that the
eﬀect of education levels in improving citizens' ability to perceive party ideological
locations is conditional on political context. First, in cases where the supply of
such information is limited due to less democratic experience and less programmatic
party politics, the eﬀect of education is weakened. However, the eﬀect of education
increases in the contexts where we expect less clarity of party position information
where parties are least polarized and where institutional factors add complexity to
party competition.
∗The authors beneﬁted from helpful comments from Petra Schleiter, Neil Vilsavanich, Nick Vivyan,
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1 Introduction
Without ideological labels, programmatic party representation would be diﬃcult or im-
possible. Party positions are the political information that capture the policy implications
of parties (Dalton, Farrell and McAllister, 2011; Klingemann, 2009; Powell, 2013) and fa-
cilitate policy-based mandates and accountability (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin, 1999;
Adams et al., 2004; McDonald and Budge, 2005; Budge, 2012). As a result, party po-
sitions are widely regarded as a central part of policy-based party competition and vote
choices. A large amount of existing research shows that citizens' perceptions of party ide-
ological locations inﬂuence how they vote (Merrill and Grofman, 1999; Adams, Merrill III
and Grofman, 2005; Thomassen, 2005; Kedar, 2005; Duch, May and Armstrong, 2010;
Carlin, Singer and Zechmeister, 2015). However, with important exceptions (Granberg
and Holmberg, 1988; Merrill, Grofman and Adams, 2001; Dahlberg, 2013; Zakharova and
Warwick, 2014), we know less about how the factors that aﬀect citizens perception of
ideological information about parties vary across countries.
In this paper, we focus on how political sophistication aﬀects the ability to correctly
perceive political parties' ideological positions. Speciﬁcally, we focus on how these eﬀects
are conditioned by political contexts. Our central argument is that the eﬀect of political
sophistication should be mediated by macro-level variables inﬂuencing both the supply and
clarity of information. These, we argue, represent distinct mechanisms. While a limited
supply of information reduces the eﬀectiveness of sophistication in explaining the accuracy
of left-right perceptions, increased clarity of information decreases its importance.
To examine this empirically, we make use of data from the Comparative Study of Elec-
toral Systems (CSES). This broad cross-national sample of democracies including multiple
regions allows us to examine how a variety of political contexts inﬂuence the information
obtained by citizens about the ideological position of political parties. We use Aldrich-
McKelvey scaling (Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977; Palfrey and Poole, 1987; Hare et al., 2015)
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to estimate perceived party left-right positions adjusted for individual perceptual bias and
generate a measure of party ideological misperception. We analyze the correlates of this
misperception using a multilevel regression model combining individual and country-level
variables. We ﬁnd that education level is an important determinant of citizen perception,
but that this eﬀect depends on several factors associated with the supply and clarity of
ideological information. Contexts where democracy is long established and parties are
more programmatic improve the underlying amount of ideological information available,
which results in an increase in the importance of education as a predictor of accuracy.
Without such information, the eﬀect of education is no longer present. The importance
of education further depends on the clarity of how this information is transmitted, where
education level is more important in presidential and federal institutional contexts. Fi-
nally, the eﬀect of education lessens as the party system is more polarizedwhere party
diﬀerentiation clariﬁes ideological distinctions between parties.
2 Individual Sophistication and Ideological Information
Scholars have long been interested in how citizens perceive the ideology of politicians.
The notion of examining ideological placement on a spatial scale dates back to early
studies of voting behavior in the US (Campbell et al., 1960) concerned with the lack of
consistency in the ideological structure evident in voters' perceptions (Converse, 1964).
In matters such as participation, variation in the US case has often been attributed
to individual characteristics (Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978; Brady,
Verba and Schlozman, 1995). Prominent among these factors is political sophistication,
which is often correlated with (but not necessarily causally resulting from) measures of
educational attainment (Neuman, 1986; Luskin, 1987, 1990; Carpini and Keeter, 1996;
Mondak, 1999, 2001; Goren, 2004; Highton, 2009). Political sophistication has become
a key concept in the ﬁeld of individual political decision-making and voting behavior
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(Neuman, 1986; Luskin, 1987, 1990; Carpini and Keeter, 1996).
An inﬂuential literature ﬁnds that politically sophisticated voters are better able to
use the information short cuts to obtain ideological information (Sniderman, Brody and
Tetlock, 1993; Popkin, 1994; Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Carpini and Keeter,
1996; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Lau and Redlawsk, 2001, 2006). In particular, Lupia
and McCubbins (1998) emphasize the role of institutional design (electoral, legislative,
and executive institutions) in enhancing citizen's ability to use heuristics to make decisions
eﬃciently. Lau and Redlawsk (2001, 2006) indicate that partisanship and ideology are key
sources of political heuristics that enhance voters' decision making process in combination
with political sophistication. In general, less politically sophisticated voters should be in a
weaker position to use such information to identify ideological distinctions among parties.
Various individual characteristics such as cognitive ability, socialization and engage-
ment inﬂuence political sophistication. Since similar factors also inﬂuence educational
attainment, it has often served as an indirect means of capturing the ability of citizens
to make use of political information. Assuming that the relationship between education
and political sophistication means the former can serve as a proxy for the latter, previous
research would lead us to expect that the more educated citizens within a country should
better able to identify party locations on average.
While the level of education may explain the variation in knowledge of left-right party
placement within a country, contextual factors that vary across countries should change
how this eﬀect functions. Without complete knowledge of political information, voters rely
on certain information as heuristics for making reasonable political choices (Conover and
Feldman, 1989; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1993; Popkin, 1994; Lupia, 1994; Lupia
and McCubbins, 1998; Lau and Redlawsk, 2001, 2006). In comparative perspective, the
role of institutional design (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998) as well as party and ideological
heuristics (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001) are important. These institutional and partisan
factors shape voters' perception of party ideological positions and vary across country
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contexts. Thus, both the underlying supply of information and the clarity of transmission
of information are critical to political perceptions. If party ideological label information
is weakly developed, counteracted by party behavior, or complicated by the institutions
in which parties compete, party labels are likely to be less eﬀective in conveying party
positions.
How does the macro-level context modify the eﬀect of political sophistication on indi-
vidual voters' political perception? Studies in comparative politics have examined system-
level factors regulating the linkage between citizens and parties (Przeworski, Stokes and
Manin, 1999; Powell, 2000; Strøm, Müller and Bergman, 2003; McDonald and Budge,
2005; Budge, 2012). Especially in advanced democracies, considerable research has ex-
amined the estimation of voters' and parties' positions, and the alignment between these
(Merrill and Grofman, 1999; Adams, Merrill III and Grofman, 2005; Kedar, 2005; Duch,
May and Armstrong, 2010). Survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Sys-
tems (CSES) has been especially useful to clarifying these voter-party linkages (Klinge-
mann, 2009; Dalton and Anderson, 2011; Dalton, Farrell and McAllister, 2011), partic-
ularly with regard to how left-right party positions aﬀect voting choice. Thus, we know
there is a great deal of variation in ideological structure across countries and regions
(Horowitz and Browne, 2005; Dalton, 2006; Hellwig, 2008; Linzer, 2008, 2011; Lupu and
Riedl, 2013). Though not necessarily focused on perceptions of party ideological informa-
tion, some cross-national research has focused on political knowledge emphasizing macro
factors (Gordon and Segura, 1997; Grönlund and Milner, 2006) while others have shown
that the level of voters' political sophistication conditions electoral accountability, partic-
ularly in new democracies (Duch, 2001; Gomez and Wilson, 2006).
In a pioneering study of the relationship between political sophistication and party
system perceptions, Granberg and Holmberg (1988) examines the US and Sweden and
concludes that the perceptual consensus in party placement is higher in Sweden than in
the US due to the diﬀerences in ideological structure and party systems (See also Granberg
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1987; Listhaug, Macdonald and Rabinowitz 1994.). More recent research analyzes how
individual voters evaluate parties, such as party attachment (Huber, Kernell and Leoni,
2005), assimilation and contrast (Merrill, Grofman and Adams, 2001; Drummond, 2010),
valance judgment (Warwick and Zakharova, 2013), perceived polarization (Lupu, 2014),
and perceptual agreement (Dahlberg, 2009).
Here, we focus on the factors that condition the relationship between political so-
phistication conditions and voters' perception of party positions by using the broadest
available sample. As this sample includes countries outside of the set of established ad-
vanced democracies, we can investigate a variety of structural characteristics of political
systems, such as the eﬀect of democratic experience, party system linkages, and polar-
ization, as well as institutional features such as presidentialism, federalism, and electoral
systems. In the following sections, we review the contextual factors that might enhance
or detract from the supply and clarity of the information available to voters to identify
party positions, and thus inﬂuence the role of political sophistication.
3 Political Contexts
Structural factors inﬂuencing The Supply of Ideological Informa-
tion
The ﬁrst type of contextual factor we consider are those that should regulate the under-
lying supply of ideological information. We consider two related factors that are likely to
aﬀect this: democratic experience and programmatic party linkages. Both relate to the
structural factors shaping the political context, such as economic development and politi-
cal institutionalization (Duch, 2001; Gomez and Wilson, 2006; Dalton and Weldon, 2007;
Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007; Hellwig, 2008, 2014; Hicken and Kuhonta, 2011; Kitschelt
and Kselman, 2013; Lupu and Riedl, 2013; Gélineau, 2013). Democratic experience inﬂu-
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ences the supply of party ideological information, where older democracies should provide
more information on ideological locations. The use of this information, meanwhile, should
be related political sophistication. Thus, we suggest that these information supply fac-
tors interact with individuals' sophistication in aﬀecting levels of information on party
ideology. We expect that countries with less democratic experience, which implies less
institutionalized parties (Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007; Duch, 2001; Gomez and Wilson,
2006), would provide contexts with less ideological information in party labels for vot-
ers to assess. Because this diﬃculty relates to the underlying supply of information, the
advantages of political sophistication should be limited.
Similarly, we also consider the policy-based or clientelistic nature and of party com-
petition. At the system level, the strength of ideological connections between parties and
voters is often thought to be regulated by the degree to which a system is characterized
by programmatic politics, which in turn is associated with parties with clearer policy
reputations (Kitschelt, 2000; Stokes, 2005; Keefer, 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007;
Hicken, 2011; Kitschelt et al., 2010; Stokes et al., 2013; Harbers, de Vries and Steenber-
gen, 2013). Where clientelistic linkages are present and/or electoral mobilization is more
focused on distributive politics or patron-client loyalties, we would expect party labels to
have supplied less useful ideological information.
In either case, then, the eﬀect of political sophisticationwhich depends on the pres-
ence of useful information for sophisticated citizens to obtainshould be diminished in
weakly institutionalized or less programmatic environments. Without such underlying
information being supplied with suﬃcient quality or quantity, the advantages of political
sophistication should not be clear.
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Institutional and Party System Factors inﬂuencing the Clarity of
Ideological Information
Next we consider factors that should aﬀect how clearly party ideological information is
transmitted to voters. These are the institutions and party system features that can
blur party ideological information, increasing the importance of political sophistication.
Institutional factors aﬀect how democratic linkages between voters and parties function
(Powell Jr and Whitten, 1993; Samuels and Hellwig, 2004; Hellwig and Samuels, 2008),
including how voters obtain information from elites (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). In
particular, Lupia and McCubbins (1998) note how institutional design enables successful
delegation relationships between citizens and elites. We elaborate on this notion, focusing
on three institutional factorspresidentialism, federalism, and the electoral system
which may aﬀect the clarity of party labels.
First, the candidate-centered nature of electoral systems is often thought to weaken
the relationship between voters and parties. While party-centric electoral systems might
enhance the clarity of party labels, it may be less clear under a candidate-centric electoral
system, where voters would also rely to some extent on information about candidates
(Carey and Shugart, 1995; Shugart, 2005; Shugart, Valdini and Suominen, 2005; Farrell
and McAllister, 2006; Schmidt, 2009; Carey, 2009).
Second, presidential systems can complicate the relationship between voters and par-
ties (Samuels, 2004; Hellwig and Samuels, 2008; Carey, 2009; Samuels and Shugart, 2010)
because the separation of legislative and executive powers can aﬀect voters' perceptions by
multiplying the potential contradictory signals associated with party labels and positions.
With presidential candidates oﬀering their own political positioning (Arnold, Doyle and
Wiesehomeier, 2017), these may provide diﬀering information from other party organs
(Kitschelt, 1999; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Carlin, Singer and Zechmeister, 2015)
Third, federalism also adds complexity to political accountability relationships, as the
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existence of multi-level governance aﬀects the clarity of party labels (Anderson, 2006;
Carey, 2009). For example, parties operating across the regional electoral environments
within a federal state can be associated with an array of diﬀerent subnational identities
(Chhibber and Kollman, 2009; Hicken, 2009).
The potential role of the party system in promoting clarity is multifaceted. One
possible party system factor is sheer party fragmentation. On one hand, it is possible
that a large number of parties could add complexity to the task of identifying positions
(Dahlberg, 2013). On the other hand, more fragmented multi-party systems per se may
promote competitive diﬀerentiation that could enhance the importance of ideological in-
formation (Dahlberg, 2009, 2013).
A more precise notion of party diﬀerentiation to promote clarity is captured directly
by party ideological polarization, in which clear separations between ideological positions
should facilitate voters' perceptions about party systems (Levendusky, 2009, 2010; Iversen
and Soskice, 2015; Zechmeister and Corral, 2012; Ezrow, Tavits and Homola, 2013; Lupu,
2014). While the expected eﬀect of party fragmentation is somewhat ambiguous, the
distance between parties has clear implications. If parties are generally further apart
that is, more polarizedit should be easier for citizens to distinguish parties from one
another (Levendusky, 2009, 2010) and the less that political sophistication should provide
an advantage.
4 Data and Methods
Data and Sample
The data used for this study come from the three modules of the Comparative Study
of Electoral Systems (CSES). A key beneﬁt of these data are that they provide left-right
placement data for a wide variety of countries, including both established democracies and
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newly democratized countries in Europe, Latin America and Asia. This variation enables
us to assess how a range of country-level characteristics interact with individual-level
characteristics to aﬀect voters' perception of party systems.
We include 104 election surveys in total containing 169,788 respondents in 43 countries
(Table 1). This sample includes all respondents who respond to at least 4 party stimuli
along with the self-reported ideology question within all of the democratic countries in
CSES. From the original 129 surveys, we exclude 12 country-years because of an insuﬃ-
cient number of party stimuli.1 We also exclude 13 election surveys from non-democratic
countries and election years during non-democratic periods2.
1Belgium 2003, Chile 1999, Russia 2000, Spain 2004, Taiwan 1996/2008, Thailand
2001, United Kingdom 1997-2005, United States 1996-2008.
2Belarus 2001-2008, Hong Kong 1998-2008, Kyrgyzstan 2005, Mexico 1997, Peru 2000,
Russia 1999-2004, South Africa 2009, and Thailand 2007. For this classiﬁcation, we rely
on Cheibub's Democracy and Dictatorship data. https://sites.google.com/site/
joseantoniocheibub/datasets/democracy-and-dictatorship-revisited (Cheibub,
Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010)
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Table 1: Data Structure of the CSES
Data N of respondents N countries N survey years
CSES 1-3 (1996-2011) 205,525 51 129
CSES 1 (1996-2002) 62,409 33 39
CSES 2 (2001-2006) 62,953 38 40
CSES 3 (2005-2011) 80,163 41 50
Sample of Eligible Cases (1996-2011) 169,788 43 104
Note: i) CSES included two diﬀerent surveys in Germany for 2002. The ﬁrst one is a telephone
survey and the second one is mail survey. ii) CSES included two diﬀerent surveys in Belgium
for 1999. One is conducted in Wallonia and the other one in Flanders. iii) The Portugual 2002
survey appears in both module 1 and 2. We consider only the data in module 1.
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4.1 Methodology
For our dependent variable, we must measure an individual's ability to perceive party
ideological location information and identify party positions within a party systems us-
ing survey data. A challenge to measuring the responses of voters' left-right ideological
information is that of diﬀerential item functioning (DIF) in survey data (Aldrich and
McKelvey, 1977; Brady, 1985, 1989). This refers to the problem of diﬀerent respondents
interpreting a question or concept diﬀerently. One approach to this that can be applied to
many existing surveys is Aldrich-McKelvey scaling (Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977; Palfrey
and Poole, 1987; Armstrong et al., 2014; Hare et al., 2015; Saiegh, 2014; Lo, Proksch
and Gschwend, 2014), which makes use of individuals' self-placements. Aldrich-McKelvey
scaling uses the relationship between individual self placements on a left-right scale and
common stimuli (parties, politicians) on the same scale to adjust for the perceptual bias
that occurs due to one's own positional perspective, thus enabling each respondent's per-
ception to be compared in generating an estimate for the overall perceived location of the
stimuli. Using this adjusted scaling output we can then generate a degree of deviation
between the individual respondent's perceived locations and those recognized in the polit-
ical system. The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) provides the left-right
self placement and party placement necessary for this. A Bayesian implementation of
Aldrich-McKelvey scaling proposed by (Hare et al., 2015) enables application to data sets
with missing stimuli response data, as is present in the CSES data.
4.2 Adjusting for Perceptual Distortion Aldrich-McKelvey Scal-
ing
As noted above, we aim to generate comparable estimates of party placements that al-
low us to compare the accuracy of these placements across respondents. The purpose of
Aldrich-McKelvey Scaling is to estimate the common stimuli behind reported ideological
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placement on a one-dimensional left-right scale, while accounting for individual percep-
tual distortion in survey data. This method involves estimating latent common stimuli,
calculating individual perceptual distortion, and adjusting individual left-right self place-
ments. Let zij be the reported parties' left-right placement j (j = 1,. . . , q by individual
i (i = 1,. . . , n). This method treats voters' reported left-right party positions as a linear
function of these true stimuli positions (ζj) and error term (µij), as follows.
zij = αi + βiζj + µij
The weight term (βi) and intercept term (αi) reﬂect voters' perceptual distortion about
party positions in political space. The intercept term (αi) indicates the extent to which
respondents tend to bias their party positions rightward or leftward. The weight term (βi)
captures voters' capacity to recognize party positions overall. Bias-corrected individual
ideal points can be obtained as follows.
xi = αi + βizi(self)
The result is intended to place parties' positions accounting for these perceptual dis-
tortions, in a common space. Here we examine the correlation between the scaled party
stimuli locations with the individual party placement responses. We use the Bayesian im-
plementation of Aldrich-McKelvey Scaling proposed by Hare et al. (2015), which allows
nearly 90% of the of respondents' to be included in the estimation of the stimuli, despite
individuals missing some stimuli3.
3The estimation process is described in detail within the Appendix. From the total
169,788 CSES observations, 139,229 include the self-placement data required to perform
Aldrich-McKelvey scaling. Of these only 100,435 (72.13%) provide complete responses for
all stimuli. Applying the minimal response threshold of four stimuli, we retain 125,224
(89.94%) of respondents in the estimation process that generates the dependent variable.
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We ﬁrst calculate the correlation between the reported individual party placements
and the estimated party stimuli locations, similar to the approach used by Palfrey and
Poole (1987). For each individual i (i = 1,. . . , n), we compute correlation coeﬃcients
between reported party placement zij and estimated party stimuli ζj as follows.
ρ(zij, ζj) =
Cov(zij, ζj)
SD(zij)SD(ζj)
The resulting correlation coeﬃcients are intended to capture the accuracy of party
position perceptions with regard to left-right perceptions. High correlations imply that
perceptions are relatively accurate while low or negative correlations indicate that esti-
mated party stimuli and a respondent's original response is very diﬀerent, suggesting a
lack of information about political party ideology. Since the original correlation coeﬃ-
cients range from -1 to 1 and are skewed rightward, we transformed this score by Fisher's
Z transformation such that our dependent variable is 1
2
{ln(1 + ρi) − ln(1 − ρi)}. The
resulting transformed correlation coeﬃcient scores range from about -0.5 to +2.5 and are
nearly normally distributed with mean of 1.24 and standard deviation of 1.07.
4.3 Independent Variables
Individual sophistication
In our research design, we are interested demonstrating how country-level factors aﬀect the
overall supply and clarity of the information citizens have about party ideological locations
and how these factors conditions the eﬀect of individual sophistication. This is measured
via educational attainment, which we treat as a proxy for the individual sophistication
associated with greater demand for information on party ideological positions. We analyze
this relationship by using interaction terms between the individual education level variable
and country-level variables. To facilitate this, we make a binary variable for education
level, which is designed to standardize and simplify the education measure across cases
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identifying citizens who likely have a relatively higher demand for political information. In
the CSES, the education level of the respondent consists of 8 categories about individual
education level4. We generate from this a binary variable of relatively `high' education
and `low' education within each country-year. Speciﬁcally, those who are equal or greater
than the country median education level are coded as 1, and otherwise coded 0. This
binary education variable is used to interact with the system-level variables described in
the following sections.
Structural Factors inﬂuencing the supply of information
Democratic Experience. Most importantly, we consider the degree of experience with
democracy, which we use to capture the quality of party system information that may
emerge in the process of the institutionalization of the party system. Because this is often
connected to the distinction between `new' and `established' democracies, we capture this
with years of democratic experience in the current democratic period. We use Cheibub's
Democracy and Dictatorship data (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010) to obtain the
years since democratic transitions.
Programmatic Linkage between Voters and Parties. To assess the degree to which the
party system provides programmatic party labels, we use the interaction between indi-
vidual education and programmatic linkage between voters and parties (Kitschelt, 2000;
Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). We make use of Kitschelt's Democratic Accountability
and Linkages Project Data (Kitschelt and Freeze, 2010; Kitschelt and Kselman, 2010,
2013), speciﬁcally the General Level of Eﬀort variable which captures politicians' em-
phasis on preferential beneﬁts at the country level, as opposed to programmatic policy
4The 8 categories consist of the following: 1 None, 2 Incomplete primary, 3 Pri-
mary completed, 4 Incomplete secondary, 5 Secondary completed, 6 Post-secondary
trade/vocational school, 7 University degree incomplete, and 8 University undergradu-
ate degree completed.
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positions. This variable comes from an expert survey and ranges from 1 to 4.5 Kitschelt's
data aggregates individual expert responses into a continuous country-level variable that
we use to capture this concept.
Institutional and partisan Factors inﬂuencing the clarity of information
Presidentialism. The ﬁrst institutional variable we examine is the presence of a presi-
dential system, which we expect might reduce the clarity of party labels by separating
presidential and legislative parts of the party system. We code presidential systems di-
chotomously.6
Federalism. Second, we consider the eﬀect of federalism, which also aﬀects the linkage
between voters and parties and clarity of party labels by introducing regional venues for
party competition that can complicate the clarity of national party labels. We use the
CSES code for the 9 federal countries in the sample.7
Eﬀective Number of Electoral Parties. Further, we examine the interaction between
individual education with the quantitative aspect of party systems. Following the existing
research about party systems, we utilize the eﬀective number of electoral parties, following
Taagepera (1997).
5The original question (b6) is as follows: In general, how much eﬀort do politicians
and parties in this country make to induce voters with preferential beneﬁts to cast their
votes for them? The answers are the following four categories: 1 A negligible eﬀort or
none at all, 2 A minor eﬀort, 3 A moderate eﬀort, and 4 A major eﬀort.
6For the semi-presidential cases, we classify premier-presidentialism into the pure par-
liamentary category and president-parliamentarism into the presidential category. We
rely on Robert Elgie's website http://www.semipresidentialism.com/ to classify semi-
presidential countries.
7Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Switzer-
land
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Party Polarization. Another aspect of the party system aﬀecting the supply of in-
formation is polarization. Here, our intent is to capture whether parties are suﬃciently
separated, in general, to better enable the identiﬁcation of labels by voters. To examine
this, we make use of a party system polarization index developed by Dow (2001), Alvarez
and Nagler (2004), Dalton (2008), and Lupu (2014). The index is calculated by summing
the distances between each party's position and the average party position and weighting
these distances by party sizes. Along these lines, Lupu (2014) computes polarization fol-
lowing Dalton (2008) by calculating the standard deviation of the expert party positions
generated in the CSES expert survey weighted by the vote share of each party. We use
this score to measure party polarization.
Electoral System. As we note above, the party-centric nature of an electoral system
may enhance the clarity of party labels. We therefore wish to test for any interaction
eﬀect between individual-level education and the electoral system type. While there are
many possibilities with regard to electoral systems categories, we break them into the ﬁve
relatively homogeneous groupings based on intra-party characteristics that should allow
us to uncover any patterns: 1. closed list PR, including mixed-member proportional
representation (CLPR)8, 2. ﬂexible-list PR (party-ordered lists that can be inﬂuenced by
preference voting); 3. open list PR (with rank determined entirely by preference votes),
4. mixed member majoritarian systems (MMM, with independent nominal and closed
party-list tiers), and 5. all forms of systems without party lists (where only candidates
receive votes), including plurality, Alternative Vote, Single Transferable Vote and two-
round systems.
8Closed list proportional representation includes cases of mixed-member proportional
representation within a single category because the list tier is closed list and is the main
factor in the allocation of seats.
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Control Variables
In addition to education level, we control for ﬁve additional individual variables from
the CSES: age, gender, income level, closeness to a party, and political participation. We
utilize individual respondent data from CSES. The ﬁrst two variables, age and gender, are
straightforward and we can use the original survey response. For the income variable, we
transform the original categorical variable into a binary variable. Respondents equal or
higher than the country median income are coded as 1, otherwise as 0. Further, we include
two other micro-level variables related to political activity. These include a binary variable
about general party identiﬁcation (Do you feel close to any political parties or not) and a
political participation measure from CSES, which refers to whether the respondent voted
in the latest election. We also include one survey-level control for the number of stimuli,
to account for any potential artifacts created by that quantity.
5 Results
Given the multilevel nature of the data, we use linear regression analysis with random
intercepts for the survey/country-year groups. Table 2 shows the result of the analysis.
The ﬁrst column of this table includes a regression model with all variables described,
without interactions, while the second introduces interactions with individual level edu-
cation. Examining the ﬁrst model, we note ﬁrst that education levels have a statistically
signiﬁcant and a substantively large impact on the ability of citizens to identify the posi-
tion of parties. Consistent with previous literature, we also ﬁnd higher accuracy among
older, male, and higher income respondents, as well as among party identiﬁers and those
participating in the most recent election.
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Table 2: Determinants of Party Position Accuracy
Model 1 Model 2
(interactions)
Coeﬀ. S. E. Coeﬀ. S. E.
Education .1992∗∗∗ (.0086) .0693 (.1015)
Age .0012∗∗∗ (.0002) .0010∗∗∗ (.0002)
Gender -.0658∗∗∗ (.0069) -.0665∗∗∗ (.0069)
Income .1259∗∗∗ (.0075) .1282∗∗∗ (.0075)
Close to a Party .0991∗∗∗ (.0072) .0999∗∗∗ (.0071)
Political participation .1617∗∗∗ (.0109) .1612∗∗∗ (.0109)
CLPR .3814∗ (.1570) .3321∗ (.1555)
FLPR .1846 (.1643) .1553 (.1627)
OLPR .0906 (.1759) .0839 (.1746)
MMM .3129+ (.1899) .3746∗ (.1890)
ENEP -.0105 (.0066) -.0126+ (.0066)
Clientelistic Linkages -.2630∗∗ (.0916) -.2065∗ (.0914)
Polarization .0885∗∗∗ (.0231) .0997∗∗∗ (.0231)
Presidentialism -.0107 (.1315) -.0908 (.1314)
Federalism -.2414∗ (.1094) -.3838∗∗∗ (.1095)
log(Democratic Experience) .0548 (.0531) -.0108 (.0531)
Number of party stimuli -.0404 (.0304) -.0406 (.0298)
Education × CLPR .0299 (.0309)
Education × FLPR .0131 (.0315)
Education× OLPR -.0215 (.0361)
Education × MMM -.1014∗ (.0421)
Education × ENEP .0027 (.0017)
Education× Clientelistic Linkages -.0727∗∗ (.0227)
Education × Polarization -.0162∗∗ (.0053)
Education × Presidentialism .0897∗∗ (.0317)
Education × Federalism .1609∗∗∗ (.0271)
Education × log(Democratic Experience) .0828∗∗∗ (.0129)
Constant 1.0035∗ (.4328) 1.1425∗∗ (.4315)
Observations 84695 84695
No. of Groups(Surveys) 87 87
log(likelihood) -119707.87 -119523.00
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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While the direct eﬀect of presidentialism is not statistically signiﬁcant, we ﬁnd that
federalism is associated with less accuracy in discerning party positions. In addition,
electoral systems have some direct eﬀect, where the more candidate-oriented electoral
systemsopen list and non-list nominal systemsexhibit some tendency toward less ac-
curate left-right perceptions when compared to closed-list systems. We do not ﬁnd any
relationships with party fragmentation.9 A clear eﬀect is seen with polarization, however,
a party-system factor regulating the clarity of information supplied to voters.
Our main interest here, however, is to determine whether system-level factors mediate
the relationship with education. In the second column of 2, we present a model with each
system-level variable interacted with individual education level. In addition to the direct
eﬀect of polarization on increasing accuracy, we also see that more polarized systems seem
to simplify the information needed for perceptual accuracy such that both high and low
education respondents have a more similar ability to identify party placements. Taken
together with the direct eﬀect noted above, we ﬁnd that polarization increases the ability
of citizens to identify party ideology in general, but decreases the relevance of education
in explaining this within-country variation.
Two variables we have investigated, the structural variables pertaining to democratic
experience and clientelism, are intended to capture the underlying supply of ideological
information from parties, either due to their institutionalization or programmatic nature.
Without this supply, political sophistication should have less impact. Indeed, we ﬁnd that
democratic experience has an important conditioning eﬀect of education, an eﬀect shown
in Figure 2. The diﬀerence between high and low education appears to be a phenomenon
associated with experienced democracies, where the supply of party label information is
9It should be reiterated that our measure only diﬀerentiates among multi-party settings
where CSES has provided four party stimuli and thus this does not capture all variation
relevant to this variable.
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Figure 1: Marginal Eﬀects of Education on Perceptual Accuracy, by Party Polarization
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likely to be suﬃcient for informed voters to make use of it. Meanwhile, in new democracies,
a greater demand for such information, as we expect from more educated voters, does not
enable much greater ability to discern the ideological positions of parties. We interpret
this to mean that new democracies provide too little information for consistent party
placement, even for more educated voters.10
We examine a similar type of concept using our measure of the degree of clientelistic
party linkages (i.e., politicians' emphasis on preferential beneﬁts). Even while holding
constant democratic experience, we ﬁnd a similar eﬀect for this variable. Education
matters most in more programmatic party systems, where we would expect the supply
of information would be greatest. In systems where clientelistic linkages appear to be
10We also considered a model including a closely related variable, the role of post-
communist legacies, which we found did not directly eﬀect on the dependent variable nor
have a statistically signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect in models including democratic experience.
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Figure 2: Marginal Eﬀects of Education on Perceptual Accuracy, by Democratic Experi-
ence
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Figure 3: Marginal Eﬀects of Education on Perceptual Accuracy, by Degree of Clientelistic
Parties
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present (that is, with less programmatic parties), voters of all education levels have similar
diﬃculty in discerning party positions. Figure 3 shows the declining marginal eﬀect of
education in predicting accuracy in left-right perceptions as the degree of clientelistic
tendencies increase.
With regard to the constitutional features of presidentialism and federalism, we ﬁnd
that there is a stronger eﬀect of education in both systems, suggesting that the complexity
created by these contexts increases the gap between respondents with higher and lower
education. We ﬁnd that party fragmentation, however, does not condition the eﬀects of
education level to a statistically signiﬁcant degree. Further, while electoral systems have a
direct eﬀect noted above, we do not generally ﬁnd expected patterns regarding legislative
electoral systems conditioning the eﬀect of education. The eﬀect is similar across types
of systems, with the exception that the eﬀect of education is weaker in the most diverse
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category, MMM.11.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we aim to understand how and when individual sophistication is most
important to the accuracy of citizens' party placements. We identify and distinguish
supply and clarity factors at the system level potentially inﬂuencing the quality and
transmission of information about party labels. Using cross-national data from the Com-
parative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) from democracies in all regions, we evaluate
the basis for voter's ability to identify party ideological locations via an application of
Aldrich-McKelvey scaling to a broad sample of self placement and party placement sur-
vey data.
With this approach, we examined how the eﬀects of political sophisticationmeasured
as relative educational attainmentvary across a wide variety of contexts. This has al-
lowed us to determine whether these eﬀects are enhanced or mitigated by certain institu-
tional or party system features. Speciﬁcally, we sought to measure how the demand for
information associated by political sophistication interacts with the supply and clarity of
information provided by the overall electoral environment.
We ﬁnd somewhat weaker average ability to place parties in contexts of federalism and
less programmatic parties, and better average ability in closed-list and polarized systems.
Most important, however, are our ﬁndings concerning the mediating role of factors that
11Although this ﬁnding suggests that MMM systems limit the eﬀect of education, we
emphasize caution in this interpretation as this category contains a series of unique sys-
tems with ambiguous overall institutional eﬀects. Thus there is greater doubt in this
category that this eﬀect is related to the electoral system itself. The main purpose of
including this distinction within the categorical scheme is to avoid pooling these unique
cases within the other categories.
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inﬂuence the supply and clarity of party information. These contextual factors change
the role that education level plays in citizen's perception of parties. With regard to
factors aﬀecting the supply of party information, our ﬁndings suggest that the political
sophistication eﬀects highlighted by advanced democracy research are likely limited to
(or at least much stronger within) such cases. In the context of newer democracies and
less programmatic democracies, political sophistication (education) appears to have little
eﬀect. Again, these environments do constrain the ability of voters to identify parties, on
average. However, voters with various education levels seem to face this constraint to a
similar degree in these less programmatic contexts.
In contexts where the clarity and complexity of party ideological information might
be greater (under presidentialism and federalism) we see an increase the importance of
sophistication, which is consistent with comparisons made between the US and Europe in
previous literature (Listhaug, Macdonald and Rabinowitz, 1994; Granberg and Holmberg,
1988). Similarly, we also ﬁnd that party polarization, which generally enhances the overall
ability to discern among party positions, reduces the importance of educational diﬀerences
among voters.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the persistent eﬀects of sophistication throughout the lit-
erature on advanced democracies are in many cases dependent on contextual factors.
While these diﬀerences could be interpreted as form of inequality in programmatic rep-
resentation, these diﬀerences can also be seen as reﬂecting the quality of programmatic
competition in advanced democracies countries. Meanwhile, our ﬁndings suggest that the
least complex electoral environments do substantially mitigate these disparities. Con-
versely, the democratic beneﬁts of horizontal and vertical separations of power may also
be bring along potential challenges for uniformity in citizens' engagement in policy-based
political choices.
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Appendix: Bayesian Aldrich-McKelvey Scaling Proce-
dure
As described above, we employ Bayesian Aldrich-McKelvey Scaling Hare et al. (2015) on
the CSES mass survey data to derive a one-dimensional left-right-scaling from the self-
reported ideological positions and party positions (stimuli). As noted, in the process of
correcting the biases of self-reported ideology and party positions, this method reveals
the voters' degree of distortion in perceptions of party positions. This enables us to
generate for each respondent a correlation coeﬃcient between the raw stimuli placement
and scaled stimuli locations.
We estimate the key parameters αi, βi, and ζj as follows. First, following Hare et al.
(2015), we set uniform distributions for the prior of αi and βi.
αi ∼ U(−100, 100)
βi ∼ U(−100, 100)
Following Hare et al. (2015), we anchor the scaling process by choosing the leftmost
party and the rightmost party stimuli. To establish these stimuli locations, we rely on the
original implementation of Aldrich-McKelvey Scaling (Poole, Rosenthal, Lewis, Lo and
Carroll, 2016; Poole, Lewis, Rosenthal, Lo, Carroll et al., 2016), which is restricted to the
respondents who place all parties along with self placement. Identifying the left most and
right most stimuli from that output, we constrain these stimuli in the Bayesian estimation
by setting the most left stimulus ζleft between -5.5 and -5 and the most right stimulus
ζright between 5 and 5.5. The other priors for the true stimuli are normally distributed.
We run two Markov chains, discard the ﬁrst 10,000 MCMC iteration as burn in, store
the subsequent 5000 and use the median (50th percentile) of the posterior distribution of
these parameters (αi, βi, and ζj).
ζleft ∼ N(0, 1)T (−5.5,−5)
ζright ∼ N(0, 1)T (5, 5.5)
ζj ∼ N(0, 1)
Because the original implementation of Aldrich-McKelvey scaling allows no missing
values in placement of any party position, this would mean including only about 72% of
available respondents in generating the stimuli estimates. In the Bayesian implementa-
tion, cases lacking a complete set of stimuli responses are still included in the process of
generating the stimuli responses. As a result, nearly 90% of the of respondents' can be
used in the estimation of stimuli locations for each country-year due to retaining indi-
viduals missing some stimuli. Missing stimuli data in the context of the MCMC process
described above increases the uncertainty of point estimates, but we limit the eﬀect of this
uncertainty by only including respondents who had placed at least 4 party stimuli, both
in the estimation of the stimuli and in the analysis presented above. We also examined a
sample including only the individuals without missing stimuli responses and ﬁnd results
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very similar to those reported in Table 2.
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Table 3: Appendix: Determinants of Party Position Accuracy, Respondents with Com-
plete Stimuli Responses Only
(Model 1) (Model 2)
(interactions)
Coeﬀ. S. E. Coeﬀ. S. E.
Education .1923∗∗∗ (.0096) .0579 (.1135)
Age .0013∗∗∗ (.0003) .0012∗∗∗ (.0003)
Gender -.0675∗∗∗ (.0076) -.0685∗∗∗ (.0076)
Income .1335∗∗∗ (.0083) .1357∗∗∗ (.0083)
Close to a Party .0977∗∗∗ (.0079) .0980∗∗∗ (.0078)
Political participation .1714∗∗∗ (.0122) .1708∗∗∗ (.0122)
CLPR .4042∗ (.1663) .3478∗ (.1653)
FLPR .2443 (.1741) .2054 (.1729)
OLPR .1219 (.1864) .0959 (.1856)
MMM .3771+ (.2012) .4393∗ (.2009)
ENEP -.0112 (.0070) -.0138∗ (.0070)
Clientelistic Linkages -.2685∗∗ (.0970) -.2206∗ (.0974)
Polarization .0867∗∗∗ (.0245) .0997∗∗∗ (.0245)
Presidentialism .0053 (.1393) -.0562 (.1398)
Federalism -.2304∗ (.1160) -.3788∗∗ (.1166)
log(Democratic Experience) .0643 (.0563) .0028 (.0565)
Number of party stimuli -.0412 (.0322) -.0416 (.0316)
Education × CLPR .0401 (.0343)
Education × FLPR .0246 (.0351)
Education × OLPR .0053 (.0401)
Education × MMM -.1006∗ (.0462)
Education× ENEP .0035+ (.0019)
Education × Clientelistic Linkages -.0606∗ (.0256)
Education × Polarization -.0181∗∗ (.0059)
Education × Presidentialism .0642+ (.0354)
Education × Federalism .1678∗∗∗ (.0308)
Education × log(Democratic Experience) .0766∗∗∗ (.0145)
Constant .9238∗ (.4587) 1.0667∗ (.4590)
Observations 69907 69907
No. of Groups(Surveys) 87 87
log(likelihood) -98821.71 -98691.59
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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